Category Archives: Section 4.1(a)(iv)

S 04.1.1.4

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(iv) Pricing Bands. FTE-based pricing, including pricing bands, may vary across broad categories of institutions. The categories are:

Also posted in Article 04, Section 4.1, Section 4.1(a), Settlement | Comments closed

S 04.1.1.4.1

5 responses to “S 04.1.1.4.1”

  1. Deven Desai says:

    Corporate subscription models may pose threats to innovation and entrepreneurial activities (this becomes a toll for information and works where congestion is not necessarily a problem).

  2. Say more. How does offering a subscription pose more threats to innovation than not offering one would?

  3. Deven Desai says:

    It is difficult to know exactly how this product (if that is what is) will function. Imagine if Google has stayed with its initial offering. More folks could have come in and played with the information for a host of reasons and opened up new possibilities. The Settlement, as a general matter, seems to lock down many ways one could use this information. James, have you looked at the linking restrictions? As far a corporate pricing goes, it will be highly difficult for anyone to compete in this arena. I am saying that the vague corporate language may be O.K. or may be a way to claim that any corporate entity (non-profits seem oddly absent from the Settlement for example) must pay fee (possibly huge) just to gain access. That is something to think about when we are looking at this much information.

  4. Deven Desai says:

    So apparently Einer Elhauge has a paper, WHY THE GOOGLE BOOKS SETTLEMENT IS PROCOMPETITIVE arguing for that the deal is good for competition. Brett Frischmann pointed me to it. I have to read it, but I still wonder whether folks are assuming facts that may be true once the deal is executed. Brett also noted Matt Sag’s paper THE GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT AND THE FAIR USE COUNTERFACTUAL.

  5. Einer’s paper; Matthew’s paper. Einer’s paper makes some factual mistakes about the settlement, but a lot of the analysis is very good indeed. Matthew’s paper is less ambitious (though I understand he’s hard at work extending its intellectual ambitions), but he does a very good job at walking through the way the settlement fits together and how it changes the status quo.

    Deven, what do you mean by “more people could have come in and played with this information” mean? Has Google in some way foreclosed them from doing so? Not in any way that I can see. The settlement locks down only what Google does with its scans. That’s why I have a hard time getting really upset about some of the limitations the settlement places on Google; the corpus of books is still less encumbered than it was when it just existed on paper.

    I think there is a serious antitrust risk with the settlement, but that risk has more to do with Google getting to play fast and loose with copyright law while no one else does.

(1) Corporate (may include per seat licensing in addition to FTE);

Also posted in Article 04, Section 4.1, Section 4.1(a), Section 4.1(a)(iv)(1), Settlement | Comments closed

S 04.1.1.4.2

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(2) Higher Education Institutions, which will be sub-divided into sub-categories based on the Carnegie Classifications for Institutions of Higher Education within the United States;

Also posted in Article 04, Section 4.1, Section 4.1(a), Section 4.1(a)(iv)(2), Settlement | Comments closed

S 04.1.1.4.3

6 responses to “S 04.1.1.4.3”

  1. Deven Desai says:

    Excluding K-12 seems to be a devastating blow to poor school districts and innovative teachers trying to find the best material for their students. Is this clause a censorship clause? Is it designed to protect textbook publishers? What is the purpose here?

  2. My understanding of this provision is that the idea is to allow subscriptions to schools, but not access from home. I suppose the reason might be that so many families have kids in school that this would mean K-12 access would almost be “everyone” access. But it does limit some innovative uses — no using the subscription for homework, for example.

  3. Deven Desai says:

    Maybe. Still it seems odd that the Registry makes this decision.

  4. That’s the glass half-empty way of looking at it; saying “at least they left the possibility open” is the glass half-full way. Both are true.

  5. benjamin says:

    Why does Google give institutions of higher learning free access based on the number of students and classification (see Section 4.8), but limit k-12 schools [see Section 4.1(a)(iv)(3)] by requiring Registry approval? This doesn’t seem to match up with Google’s stated goals.

  6. We may be seeing the negotiating influence of the copyright owners here. Google would like to sell through as many channels as possible; they may want more limits.

(3) School (K-12) (no remote access without Registry approval);

Also posted in Article 04, Section 4.1, Section 4.1(a), Section 4.1(a)(iv)(3), Settlement | Comments closed

S 04.1.1.4.4

One response to “S 04.1.1.4.4”

  1. Deven Desai says:

    Why limit government access at all? Again what is the idea behind this limit?

(4) Government (no remote access without Registry approval) (may include per seat licensing in addition to FTE);

Also posted in Article 04, Section 4.1, Section 4.1(a), Section 4.1(a)(iv)(4), Settlement | Comments closed

S 04.1.1.4.5

2 responses to “S 04.1.1.4.5”

  1. Deven Desai says:

    The objective is to “realiz[e] broad access to the Books by the Public,” but the deal categorically limits it unless the Registry approves. Inconsistent. Also did I miss something or is Public undefined in the Settlement Terms?

  2. You’re right; “Public” is undefined. Much in this settlement depends on the good faith and competence of the Registry.

(5) Public (no remote access without Registry approval); and

Also posted in Article 04, Section 4.1, Section 4.1(a), Section 4.1(a)(iv)(5), Settlement | Comments closed

S 04.1.1.4.6

4 responses to “S 04.1.1.4.6”

  1. Deven Desai says:

    This clause reveals that the true goal is to divide up the world and charge as much as possible at each level. Public access to the information is not a real concern. That being said there may be arguments as why one should take a licensing approach. Those argument need to made clearly and prove that this model is the best one.

    For example, one could have the snipets search for many books or one could allow a user to see pages with specific search terms plus or minus one page on either side of the key page. If the user wanted the book, the user could then buy it, obtain it from a library, or someone may enter the market and offer it on demand (this could be the publisher or another party with rights). The problem is that the Settlement conflates the users searching for books and wanting the entire book and users who want only a portion of the book for research or other reasons. Charging for access to some of these uses is not necessarily beneficial. Put differently the case must be made that this model is the best way to meet the alleged objectives and that the other stakeholders who are not acknowledged are also served.

  2. Don’t forget the standard argument that price discrimination in intellectual property permits greater overall access than a single price would. (That it happens to shift consumer surplus to the producer is just a . . . side effect.)

    On the substance, I don’t know that the proper burden of proof lies with the proponents of the settlement on this issue. They had to show that it’s a good deal for copyright owners and the public compared with the status quo. That leaves it up to opponents to come forward and show that other models would be better.

  3. Deven Desai says:

    Standard yes. Proven? And what about Benklerish ideas of Wealth of Networks? To say it is better than status quo is a red herring. Status quo never contemplated the openness nor could it see the possibility Google is offering. The claim that is good, trust us, is indeed one they should support with models and more. Seems quite a gift to say well prove us wrong and puts the emphasis on the wrong party. And I think that your claim about pricing relies on competition. If there is not competition, then your standard claim is in trouble, correct?

  4. Actually, my claim about pricing is (even potentially) true only in the absence of competition. It depends on the existence of copyright’s exclusive rights. In a fully competitive environment, price discrimination is impossible because all prices fall to marginal cost.

    My point about the burden of proof is that if you think the settlement is sub-optimal, say what would be better.

(6) Additional categories, as agreed between Google and the Registry. Subdividing the market into additional categories may be one mechanism used to ensure broad accessibility of Books to end users.

Also posted in Article 04, Section 4.1, Section 4.1(a), Section 4.1(a)(iv)(6), Settlement | Comments closed